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INTRODUCTION

Much attention has been paid to how laws and proposed
amendments to state constitutions-that are based on the theory
that a fertilized egg, embryo, and fetus may be treated as if it is
separate and legally independent from the woman-threaten a
woman's right to terminate a pregnancy or to use certain methods
of birth control. It is undeniable that such laws are proposed by
groups motivated, in great part, by their political agenda to
recriminalize abortion. It is equally true, however, that these
measures are about more than abortion and birth control. Such
laws granting full legal personhood to eggs, embryos, and fetuses,
would, under the guise of adding one group to the constitutional
population, subtract another: the women who carry and sustain
them often at risk to their life and health.
It is this same legal theory of fetal separatism that is
presented by Mississippi's Proposition 26. This proposition seeks
to alter the Mississippi Constitution by redefining "person" to
include "every human being from the moment of fertilization,
cloning or functional equivalent thereof." 1 The measure seeks to
bestow legal rights upon fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses that,
given the simple geography of the situation, could not only be used
as a basis for the recriminalization of abortion but also to support
any number of interventions by outsiders on the pregnant woman
herself. Such interventions could be based on any perceived risk to
the fetus or the desire to hold women criminally and civilly
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1 See Miss. Initiative 26 (2011) (proposed MISS. CONST. art. III, § 33), available at
http://www.sos.ms.gov/Elections/Ini tiatives/Initiatives/Definition%20of0/o20PersonPW%20Revised.pdf.
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responsible for their pregnancy outcomes. The undeniable effect of
such measures is to denaturalize pregnant women, removing from
them the constitutional and statutory protections afforded to full
moral and legal persons. 2
Already throughout the United States the argument that
fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses may be treated as if they are
separate and legally independent of the women who carry them
has been used in a variety of factual contexts to deprive pregnant
women of their status as full constitutional persons.
I. FETAL SEPARATISM DEPRIVES PREGNANT WOMEN OF THEIR
RIGHTS TO LIBERTY, MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING, AND DUE
PROCESS
Constitutional law ensures that persons-including pregnant
women-have the right to make their own healthcare decisions.
Yet it is clear that if fertilized eggs, embryos, and fetuses are
treated as if they are separate persons with rights adverse to the
woman herself, pregnant women could lose these constitutionally
protected rights.
Harvest Rider was twenty-three years old and approximately
thirty-nine weeks pregnant when a doctor, with whom she had
consulted, came to believe that her fetus was very small for its

2 CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLICIES OF

FETAL RIGHTS 2-3 (1993) ("As the fetus is animated and personified in public culture,
the power of the state to regulate the behavior of women-both pregnant and
potentially pregnant-is strengthened. Women's rights as citizens are potentially made
contingent by fetal rights. They can be revoked or qualified by the state's higher
interest in the fetus."); Martha A. Field, Controllingthe Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 114 (1989); Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs:
Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
179 (1989); see also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 359-61 (Ill. 1988)
(refusing to recognize the tort of maternal prenatal negligence, holding that granting
fetuses legal rights in this manner "would involve an unprecedented intrusion into the
privacy and autonomy of the [state's female] citizens"); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 280 (2005) (noting that during the Court's deliberation on
Roe v. Wade, Justice Stewart insisted that the Court rule explicitly on the question of
fetal personhood, recognizing that creating a competition between the fetus and women
and "[w]eighing two sets of rights would be dangerous"); Janet Gallagher, Prenatal
Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 9
(1987).

2011]

THE COST TO ALL WOMEN

83

gestational age and therefore at risk.3 The doctor advised Ms.
Rider to go to the hospital immediately and explained that he
wanted to induce labor.
Ms. Rider, not convinced of this medical advice, obtained a
second ultrasound. After consulting with a second doctor, her
midwife, and family, she concluded that the doctor's proposed
interventions were unnecessary. 4 She decided to continue her plan
to give birth at home, vaginally, with the assistance of her
midwife. 5
The doctor disagreed with her decision, and the medical
center where he worked filed a petition in the local circuit court
seeking protective custody of Ms. Rider's fetus. 6 The court, relying
solely on a single affidavit by Ms. Rider's doctor asserting that
"the fetus was in real and immediate danger," 7 ordered that, "the
viable fetus of Harvest Rider be detained . . . by the Ashland

County Sheriffs Department to be transported to the Memorial
Medical Center, Inc. Hospital for further testing and necessary
medical treatment."
According to Ms. Rider, the police came to her house that
evening to take custody of her fetus. 9 She was escorted to the
hospital where she was forced to spend the night.' 0 A police officer
was also posted outside of her door to prevent her from leaving."
The next morning, Ms. Rider was brought to a court hearing,
appointed a public defender, and questioned by a judge. 12
According to Ms. Rider's midwife, Ms. Rider was allowed to go
home, but kept under the court's jurisdiction and ordered to

3 Affidavit in Support of the Request for Protective Custody Order at 1, In re
Viable Fetus of Rider, No. 96-JC-008 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 26, 1996).
4 Id. at 2.
5 Id.
6 Request for Temporary Physical Custody Authorization, In re Viable Fetus of
Rider, No. 96-JC-008 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 26, 1996).
7 Affidavit in Support of the Request for Protective Custody Order at 2, In re
Viable Fetus of Rider, No. 96-JC-008 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Feb. 26, 1996).
8 Order of Protective Custody, In re Viable Fetus of Rider, No. 96-JC-008 (Wis. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 26, 1996).
9 Telephone interview by Farah Diaz-Tello, Legal Fellow, National Advocates for
Pregnant Women, with Harvest Rider (April 6, 2010).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12

Id.
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submit to a schedule of medical examinations-all in the name of
the rights of the fetus. 13
Ms. Rider went to the first of these examinations. 14 She went
into labor the following week, and delivered a healthy baby at
home.15
When Laura Pemberton found no doctor who would attend
her in vaginal birth for her fourth child after a prior cesarean
delivery, she planned to give birth at home.' 6 After going into
labor, Ms. Pemberton worried she was becoming dehydrated. 17
She reasoned that she would go to a hospital for intravenous
fluids and then return home. After an obstetrician on call at the
hospital, however, learned that Ms. Pemberton was attempting a
VBAC, she refused to give the IV that Ms. Pemberton neededunless she consented to cesarean surgery. 18 Ms. Pemberton
refused, and fled the hospital.' 9
While at home, still in active labor, a sheriff came to Ms.
Pemberton's door. 20 Doctors from the hospital where Ms.
Pemberton checked in believed she was posing a risk to the life of
her unborn child by delivering vaginally and were in the process of
getting a court order to force her to have cesarean surgery. 2 '
The sheriff took Ms. Pemberton into custody, strapped her
legs together, and transported her, against her will, back to a
hospital. 22 Once in the hospital, she was permitted a "hearing" in
her hospital room. 23 Although a lawyer appeared to represent the
fetus, no lawyer was appointed for Ms. Pemberton. 24 Despite the
13 Telephone Interview by Farah Diaz-Tello, Legal Fellow, National Advocates for
Pregnant Women, with Sandra Pera, Certified Profl Midwife (Feb. 24, 2010).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Laura Pemberton, Address at National Advocates for Pregnant Women's
National Summit to Ensure the Health and Humanity of Pregnant and Birthing
Women
(January 18-21,
2007)
(on
file
with
NAPW),
available at
http://vimeo.com/4895023.
17 Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'1 Reg'1 Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1249
(N.D. Fla. 1990).
1 Ids
19 See Pemberton, supra note 16.
20 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
21 Id. at 1249-50.
22 See id. at 1250; Pemberton, supra note 16.
23 Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
24 Pemberton, supra note 16.
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fact that neither she nor the baby showed any signs of danger, the
obstetricians present were convinced that she exposed her fetus to
too much risk by continuing to deliver vaginally. 25 The judge
agreed. 26 Ms. Pemberton was sedated, and her baby was removed
via cesarean surgery against her will.27
Each time a pregnant woman is forcibly restrained and
ordered by a court to undergo medical exams or surgery she has
not consented to, she is being deprived of her right to liberty. In
both of these cases, the argument that fetuses may be treated as if
they are legally independent of the women who carry them
deprived those women of rights to privacy, bodily integrity,
medical decision-making, and due process. Fetal separatism, like
that embodied in Proposition 26, provides the basis for outsiders
to take similar actions whenever they disagree with a pregnant
woman's actions, inactions, or medical decisions during pregnancy.
Even if a court ultimately finds that there is no legal basis for the
intervention, it is often after a woman has been deprived of her
constitutional rights and legal personhood.
II. FETAL SEPARATISM DEPRIVES PREGNANT WOMEN FROM
THEIR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND FAMILY INTEGRITY

In New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. V.M.,
V.M., while making clear she would consent should it become
medically necessary, refused to pre-authorize cesarean surgery. 28
Although she had a successful vaginal birth, New Jersey hospital
workers reported her to child welfare authorities for medical
neglect of her unborn child.2 9 This report led to the removal of the
newborn from her parents' custody and her placement in foster
care.3 0 As a result of a child protection case being opened based

Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1250.
27 Id. The district court held that the court-ordered cesarean section and removal of
a laboring Ms. Pemberton from her home did not violate Ms. Pemberton's
constitutional rights. Id. at 1254.
28 974 A.2d 448, 453 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (per curiam) (Carchman, P.J.,
concurring).
29 Id. at 449-50.
30 Id. at 452.
25
26
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upon her decisions around the birth, her parental rights
ultimately were terminated. 3 '
In South Carolina, Cornelia Whitner was charged with
failing to provide proper medical care for her unborn child while
she was pregnant. 32 Ms. Whitner had given birth to a healthy
baby who tested positive for an illegal drug.3 3 As a result, she was
arrested and charged with criminal child neglect. 34 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina permitted her prosecution, holding that
the state's child abuse law could be judicially interpreted to apply
to a pregnant woman who risks harm to her viable fetus.3 5
Cases like these make clear that any provision advancing the
rights of a fetus may be used as a mechanism for intervening in
families' lives. Furthermore, prosecutors and other outsiders, like
child welfare authorities, are asserting that pregnant women have
legally enforceable duties, obligations, and responsibilities to the
fetuses that are viewed as legally separate from themselves.
For example, when Laurie Barker was arrested in New
Jersey, the indictment alleged that, while pregnant, Ms. Barker
"did cause Baby Girl Barker harm that would make her an abused
or neglected child while the said Laurie Barker had a legal duty or
had assumed the responsibility of caring for said child . . . .*"3 In
the Ohio case of State v. Gray, a pregnant woman was accused of
failing in her "duty of care, protection, or support."3 7 Furthermore,
in California, in the case of State v. Reyes, the prosecutor argued,
"This is what the [child abuse] statute absolutely says. . . . She

31

Id.

32

Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778-79 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1145

at 449 (majority opinion).

(1998).
Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 778.
35 Id. at 779-81.
36 Indictment at 3, State v. Barker, No. 605-2-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 26,
1996) (emphasis added).
37 State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 711 (Ohio 1992) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.22(A) (West 2011)); see also Brief of The Ohio Public Defender as Amicus Curiae
Supporting the Position of Appellee Tammy Gray at 2, State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710
(Ohio 1992) (No. 90-1986), 1991 WL 11240115, at *2 ("The question presented is
whether under current Ohio law a pregnant woman owes a duty of care to the fetus she
is carrying such that after her child is born she may be criminally prosecuted if her
conduct during pregnancy created a risk of physical harm or serious physical harm to
the fetus.").
33

34
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was chargeable with doing everything possible as a matter of law,
having the responsibility of her pregnancy."3 8
When a pregnant woman is regarded as having such
responsibilities, prosecutors, child welfare workers, and judges
can interpret any of her actions or inactions as evidence of her
intent toward her unborn child. So, not receiving adequate
prenatal care, inability to overcome a drug dependency, failure to
wear a seatbelt, failure to attain an optimal weight before
becoming pregnant, or refusing to preauthorize cesarean surgery
could demonstrate a woman's intent to neglect or abuse a fetus
and provide the basis for depriving her of her constitutional right
to privacy or family integrity.
III. FETAL SEPARATISM HAS BEEN USED TO DEPRIVE PREGNANT
WOMEN FROM THEIR RIGHT TO LIFE
Angela Carder was twenty-seven years old and twenty-five
weeks pregnant when she became critically ill with a recurrence of
cancer. 39 Her initial plan was to begin treatment, including
radiation and chemotherapy, as she felt she had been through too
much already not to try to prolong her life, regardless of the risks
to her fetus.40
While Ms. Carder's family and doctors were trying to carry
out her wishes, the hospital called an emergency hearing to
determine what the hospital "should do in terms of the fetus,
whether to intervene . . . and save its life." 41
At the hearing, one attorney was appointed for Ms. Carder,
and two appeared on behalf of her fetus: an attorney to represent
the fetus's interest and an attorney for the District of Columbia,
who was able to appear as parens patriae.42
A hospital neonatologist testified that cesarean surgery
would save the fetus's life; however, Ms. Carder's doctors objected
38 Preliminary Examination at 103-04, State v. Reyes, No. CR 33650 (San
Bernardino County Mun. Ct. Jan. 24-26, 1997) (emphasis added).
39 In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987).
40 See generally Id. at 613 (noting that Angela Carder "expressed a desire to her
physicians to be kept as comfortable as possible throughout her pregnancy and to
maintain the quality of her life"); Transcript of Proceedings, In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611
(D.C. June 16, 1987) (No. 87-609).
41 In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 612.
42 Id.
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to the surgery, as Ms. Carder did not consent to it and they
believed it would hasten her death. 43 Despite their objections, the
trial court determined that the surgery should be performed. 44
Ms. Carder's attorney requested an immediate stay and an
emergency appeal, which took place by phone. 45 In denying the
motion, the court of appeals accepted the idea that the District of
Columbia's interest in protecting the life of the fetus outweighed
Ms. Carder's right to stay alive for whatever time she had left. 46
The operation was performed. 47 The fetus was born alive, but
survived for a little more than two hours. 48 Angela Carder died
two days later, with the cesarean surgery listed as a contributing
factor to her death. 49
Ms. Carder's case makes clear that treating fetuses as if they
have separate legal interests from those of the pregnant women
carrying them, empower others-hospitals, lawyers, physicians,
and courts-to "make the final mortal decision."50
As the cases above illustrate, efforts to legally disconnect
fetuses from the pregnant women who sustain them and to grant
them independent constitutional status would not merely expand
membership in the population of constitutional persons, and do
not merely threaten the right to abortion or certain forms of birth
control-it would remove from pregnant women their status as
constitutional persons.

43 See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings at 4-5, In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. June 16,
1987) (No. 87-609) ('The Hospital has some reservations relative to the medical
condition of the woman being held in a non-supportive operating room environment.
She was in intensive care prior to this. . . . As I understand the medical testimony, I
think uncontroverted, she is in a particularly weakened state. This is in very real
terms, likely to end her life, this procedure.").
44 In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 612-13.
45

Id. at 612.

Transcript of Proceedings at 9, In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. June 16, 1987) (No.
87-609).
47 In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
48 Certificate of Death of Lindsey Marie Carder, In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. July
1, 1988) (No. 87-609) (filed as supplementation of the record by court-appointed
attorney for "Carder Fetus").
49 Certificate of Death of Angela Carder, In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. July 1,
1988) (No. 87-609) (filed as supplementation of the record by court-appointed attorney
for "Carder Fetus").
50 In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 612.
46
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Although a number of courts have overwhelmingly refused to
treat eggs, embryos, and fetuses as legal persons separate from
the pregnant woman, or to hold pregnant women legally
accountable to the fetus as if it were separate from her, cases like
the ones described in this essay do persist. If Proposition 26 is
adopted, women in Mississippi can expect decades of uncertainty
about what actions, inactions, or conditions justify state
interventions or render women criminally liable, and lengthy and
costly legal battles to ensure they remain constitutional persons.
Indeed, right here in Mississippi, prosecutors have brought
criminal charges against women who have suffered miscarriages
and stillbirths. s1 In one case, a teenager who suffered an
unintentional stillbirth was charged with depraved-heart
murder.5 2 Her case is pending and we hope it will be dismissed.
On October 27, 2011, in a 5 to 4 decision, the court decided that it
will not determine whether she can be tried in the first instance,
but will determine whether the law even applied, only after she
has gone to trial.53

51 See, e.g., Order Dismissing Appeal at 4, Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-IA-0819-SCT
(Miss. Oct. 27, 2011) (en banc) (King, J., objecting) (Serial: 172566), available at
http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Orders/700_61759.pdf
(order dismissing interlocutory
appeal as improvident).
52 Id. at 3.
53 Id. at 6.

